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Abstract—Mobile edge computing (MEC), affords service to
the vicinity of mobile devices (MDs), has become a key technology
for future network. Offloading big data to the MEC server
for preprocessing is a attractive choice of MDs. In the paper,
we investigate data offloading from MDs to MEC servers. A
coalitional game based pricing scheme is proposed. We apply
coalitional game to depict the offloading relationship between
MDs and MEC servers, and utilize pricing as the stimuli for
the offloading. A scheduled MD chooses one MEC server within
the same coalition for offloading, and pays the selected MEC
server for the MEC service. We formulate a coalitional game,
where MDs and MEC servers are players and their utilities
are respectively defined. Next, we analyze the formulated game.
Specially, the core is studied. Finally, utility performance of the
proposed scheme under the 2-MD and 2-MEC- server scenario
are demonstrated.
Index Terms—Mobile edge computing, offloading, coalitional
game, pricing
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile edge computing (MEC) enabling low-latency, high-
bandwidth, and agile mobile services has attracted much
attention in both academia and industry [1]-[3]. MEC is a
paradigm that provides cloud services within the vicinity of
mobile device via the radio access network. In contrast to
the service centralization of mobile cloud computing (MCC),
MEC aims to empower the network edge. Since the prox-
imity, MEC has the virtue of low latency, mobile energy
saving, privacy and security enhancement, content-awareness.
Especially, one advantage is pre-processing of large data at
the MEC server before sending it to the cloud. As fusion
of wireless communications and mobile computing, MEC is
viewed as a key technology of next generation networks, e.g.,
5G, Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Me, Tactile Internet,
Social Networks, etc.
As a novel and hot research area, there are some works
on MEC. In [4], the offloading from a single mobile device
(MD) to multiple edge devices has been investigated under a
proposed optimization framework. And the authors focus on
the task allocation and computational frequency scaling. In [5],
computation offloading together with interference management
have been jointly studied under an integrated framework. In
[6], performance guaranteed computation offloading has been
investigated for mobile-edge cloud computing. An energy
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minimizing optimization problem is proposed and solved by
apply Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. In [7], resource
allocation and tasks scheduling in heterogeneous cloud have
been studied for delay-bounded MEC. Maximization for the
probability of meeting the delay-requirements is proved to be
concave and an optimal algorithm is proposed. In [8], the
authors have investigated matching problem between the MEC
service providers (SPs) and the user equipments (UEs) under
a multi-MEC and multi-UE scenario. In [9], joint offloading
and computing optimization have been investigated in wireless
powered MEC systems. Energy cost minimization of access
point is formulated in convex framework and optimal solution
in semi-closed form is derived. In [10], the tradeoff between
service response time and Quality-of-Result (QoR) has been
identified in MEC. A new optimization framework that min-
imizes app energy consumption and service response time is
proposed by jointly optimizing the QoR and the offloading
strategy. In [11], an auction-based profit maximization method
has been proposed towards the hierarchical MEC. In [12],
energy harvesting aided MEC has been investigated, and an
online learning algorithm for offloading and auto-scaling is
proposed.
Coalitional game theory has been widely applied in design
and analysis of wireless communications system especially
when cooperation occurs [13]. In [14], a security-aware re-
source allocation approach of delivering mobile social big
data has been proposed by utilizing joint match-coalitional
game. In [15], a trust-based hedonic coalitional game has been
formulated towards trustworthy multi-cloud services commu-
nities, and a three-fold solution is derived thereafter. In [16],
A layered coalitional game algorithm is given for hierarchi-
cal cooperation in operator-controlled device-to-device (D2D)
communications. In [17], by using coalitional game theory, we
have studied cooperative transmission in vehicular networks.
Traditional data collection of edge MDs are transferred
to the core network directly with high bandwidth cost and
latency. Instead, data collection is performed at the edge of the
network in MEC. Bandwidth consumption is greatly reduced
and latency performance improves. We investigate the data
offloading of MEC in the paper. Specifically, data of MDs are
transmitted to neighboring MEC servers (offloading from MDs
to MEC servers), where preprocessing (e.g., data analytic) is
performed, over fading channels. After data preprocessing, the
results are sent to the cloud server (over wire channels, e.g.,
fiber channels). As multiple MDs and multiple MEC servers
are considered, the data offloading from MDs to MEC server
becomes a challenge problem. How to schedule multiple MDs’
offloading?How to choose the MEC servers for offloading?
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Fig. 1. MEC network.
How to encourage offloading among MDs and MEC servers
so as to attain the virtue of MEC?
Utilizing coalitional game theory and pricing mechanism,
we propose a joint coalition-pricing based data offloading
approach. First, MDs and MEC servers form different coali-
tions. In each coalition, MDs are scheduled for data offloading
to selected MEC server within the same coalition. Selection
of MEC servers is closely related to our proposed notion
“coverage probability ” which shows the availability of MEC
servers to MDs. Furthermore, pricing mechanism is utilized
to promote cooperation between MDs and MEC servers. In
one hand, MDs could gain throughput increase when utilizing
MEC server (compared with no MEC). On the other hand,
MEC server charges the MDs that choose it as MEC service
provider in each data offloading.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The considered
system model is described in Section II. In Section III, a
coalitional game is formulated. Next, the game analysis is
preformed in Section IV. Numerical results are illustrated in
Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the whole paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, consider an MEC network consisting
of a cloud server, L MEC servers, and K MDs. The cloud
server is represented as 0. S = {1, · · · , L} and M = {L +
1, · · · , L + K} denote the sets of MEC servers and MDs,
respectively. Denote the transmit distance of MD i ∈ M as di.
That is to say, within the sphere with radius di around MD i
(referred to as transmit range), an MEC server could correctly
receive the transmitted data. When MEC server j ∈ S is in
the transmit range of MD i, we call “j covers i ”. Mobile
device i ∈ M is active with probability pi, independently of
other MDs, in each slot. When two or more mobile devices
transmit simultaneously, it is referred to as a collision. We
assume that the transmissions fail once a collision occurs.
MEC servers and MDs form coalitions to facilitate data
transmission. Mobile devices in the same coalition can coop-
erate to schedule the data transmission, and only one MD can
transmit at a slot to avoid interference. MEC servers that are
in the same coalition with MD i and cover MD i constitute the
feasible MEC server set of MD i. In each coalition, a scheduler
chooses an active mobile that can transmit while other active
MDs remain silent.
When MD i is scheduled to transmit at a time-slot, it selects
one MEC server from its feasible MEC server set, and sends
its data to the the selected MEC server for preprocessing
and forwarding. If the feasible MEC server set is empty,
i.e., no MEC server is available, the MD transmits to the
cloud server directly (with a lower rate given fixed power).
Then one MD only transmits to at most one MEC server for
each transmission. Furthermore, as no more than one MD is
scheduled to transmit at a given time-slot, one MEC server
communicates with at the most one MD during a given time-
slot. MEC server acts as a helper in data transmission from
the MD to the cloud server. When MD i utilizes MEC server
j for its transmission, MEC server j charges MD i with price
ξji per transmission.
When some MDs and MEC servers form a coalition, the
MDs would share the channel with each other in time division
multiple access (TDMA) mode, and they need to pay for
the MEC servers. However, the MDs can avoid collision
and improve bandwidth efficiency and latency. On the other
hand, although there are costs in receiving, processing and
forwarding the MDs signals, the MEC servers could achieve
revenues by charging the MDs. In a word, both MDs and MEC
servers have incentives to form coalitions.
III. COALITIONAL GAME FORMULATION
A coalitional game G is uniquely defined by the pair (N , v),
where N is the set of players, and v is the coalition value
quantifying the worth of a coalition in a game. Any non-empty
subset of N is referred to as a coalition. In the paper, players
are the MDs and the MEC server. That is to say, N = S∪M.
S ⊆ N is a coalition. Denote Ss = S ∩ S and Sm = S ∩M.
Consider a slot, let i↔ j denote MEC server j covers MD i
during the whole slot and Pji = Pr{i↔ j}.
The per bandwidth data rate increase of MD i with the edge
computing of the MEC server j is denoted as ∆ij .
1 Then the
per bandwidth rate of MD i when utilizing MEC server j
can be expressed as Rij = ri + ∆ij with ri being direct
transmission rate to the cloud server under the same power.2
Formally, the scheduler in S is a map fS : 2
S → S such
that fS(Ψ) ∈ Ψ for all Ψ ⊆ S and fS(Ψ) = ∅ iff Ψ = ∅.
The average effective throughput for MD i can be expressed
as
Ti(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
(ǫi(S) + ζi(S))
∏
j∈M\Sm
(1− pj) ,
1Since the bandwidth efficiency and latency improves with the edge
computing, then the equivalent per bandwidth data rate from the MD to the
cloud server increases.
2Specially, when direct transmission is impossible, ri = 0
3where EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
denotes the ratio of time-slots that
MD i is chosen to transmit. For example, we can assume
fS(Ψ) chooses the minimal element from the set of feasible
transmitting MD Ψ. Denote Sm =
{
s1, · · · , s|Sm|
}
with s1 >
· · · > s|Sm|, then
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={s|Sm|}
}
= ps|Sm| (1)
and
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={sk}
}
= psk
|Sm|∏
i=k+1
(1 − psi), k = 1, · · · , |Sm| − 1. (2)
In the paper, we assume that selection of the MEC server is
performed according to a uniform probability distribution for
simplicity. The average data rate for MD i with mobile edge
computing, ζi(S), is given by
ζi(S) =
∑
j∈Ss
RijPji
∏
k 6=j∈Ss
(1− Pki)
+
∑
j<k∈Ss
Rij +Rik
2
PjiPki
∏
l 6=j,l 6=k∈Ss
(1− Pli)
+
∑
j<k<l∈Ss
Rij +Rik +Ril
3
PjiPkiPli
×
∏
r 6=j,r 6=k,r 6=l∈Ss
(1− Pri) + · · ·+
∑
j∈Ss
Rij
n
∏
j∈Ss
Pji,
where n = |Ss|. If Ss = ∅, i.e., n = 0, ζi(S) = 0. The average
direct rate
ǫi(S) = ri ∗ (1− Pi),
where
Pi = 1−
∏
j∈Ss
(1− Pji)
is the probability that at least one MEC server in the coalition
covers MD i. Suppose∆ij = ∆i, i.e., the data increase for MD
i is irrelevant to the selection of MEC servers, then Rij = Ri
and the average throughput for MD i can be simplified as
Ti(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
(PiRi+ri∗(1−Pi))
∏
j∈M\Sm
(1− pj)
Remark: If there are active MDs outside S at a given time-
slot, at least one MDs outside S transmits simultaneously with
the scheduled MD in S no matter how the MDs outside S form
coalitions. Thus, there is no collision if and only if (iff) all MDs
outside S is inactive.
For MD i, the average payment made to the MEC servers
can be given by
Pi(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
χi(S)
with
χi(S) =
∑
j∈Ss
ξjiPji
∏
k 6=j∈Ss
(1− Pki)
+
∑
j<k∈Ss
ξji + ξki
2
PjiPki
∏
l 6=j,l 6=k∈Ss
(1 − Pli)
+
∑
j<k<l∈Ss
ξji + ξki + ξli
3
PjiPkiPli
×
∏
r 6=j,r 6=k,r 6=l∈Ss
(1− Pri) + · · ·+
∑
j∈Ss
ξji
n
∏
j∈Ss
Pji.
If n = 0, χi(S) = 0. Assume ξji = ξi, i.e., all the MEC
servers set the same price for MD i, then the average payment
can be simplified as
Pi(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
Piξi.
Remark: The MEC server charges the MD once the MDs
employs the MEC server for a transmission, it does not take
the collisions into account. That is to say, the actions in other
coalitions do not affect the charging.
The payoff of MD i is determined by
ui(S) = αiTi(S)− βiPi(S).
For MEC server j in S, the revenue charged from the MDs
can be given by
Rj(S) =
∑
i∈Sm
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
ηij(S)ξji, (3)
where ηij(S) is the probability that MD i employs MEC server
j for transmission, and it is given by
ηij(S) = Pji
[ ∏
k 6=j∈Ss
(1 − Pki)
+
1
2
∑
k 6=j∈Ss
Pki
∏
l 6=j,l 6=k∈Sr
(1− Pli)
+
1
3
∑
k<l,k 6=j,l 6=j∈Ss
PkiPli
∏
r 6=j,r 6=k,r 6=l∈Ss
(1− Pri)
+ · · ·+
1
n
∏
k 6=j∈Ss
Pki
]
. (4)
Assume that MEC server j receives the signal of MD i at
cost crji and the cost of pre-processing signal and forwarding
to the cloud server as c
f
ji. The average cost of MEC server j
can be expressed as
Cj(S) =
∑
i∈Sm
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
} [
c
f
jiηij(S) + Pjic
r
ji
]
. (5)
Remark: MEC server j receives the message of MD i once it
covers MD i (with probability Pji), and it pre-processes the
message and forwards only when it is selected as the helper
by MD i (with probability ηij(S)).
The payoff of MEC server j is determined by
u˜j(S) = γjRj(S)− µjCj(S).
Define v(S) ⊆ R|Ss|+|Sm| be the set of feasible payoff
vectors for S, we formulate the considered data collection
problem as a coalitional NTU-game G : (M ∪ S, v).
4IV. COALITIONAL GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we carry out analytical analysis on the
formulated game. First, we present two analytical results. Next,
we investigate the stability of the game and propose a sufficient
condition for the existence of the core.
In the beginning, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let
f(S) =
∑
i∈Sm
ui(S) +
∑
j∈Ss
u˜j(S)
denote the sum payoff of S. When γj = 1 and βi = 1, we
have
f(S) =
∑
i∈Sm
αiTi(S)−
∑
j∈Ss
µjCj(S).
That is to say, the pricing has no effect on the sum payoff in
this case.
Proof: First we can prove that χi =
∑
j∈Ss
ηij(S)ξji. Then
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
χi
= EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
} ∑
j∈Ss
ηij(S)ξji
(a)
=
∑
j∈Ss
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
ηij(S)ξji. (6)
(a) holds since EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
is irrelevant to j ∈ Ss. Next,
based on (6), we can derive∑
i∈Sm
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
χi
=
∑
i∈Sm
∑
j∈Ss
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
ηij(S)ξji. (7)
Exchanging the summation order on the right side, we get∑
i∈Su
Pi(S) =
∑
j∈Ss
Rj(S). (8)
When γj = 1 and βi = 1,
f(S) =
∑
i∈Sm
αiTi(S)−
∑
j∈Ss
µjCj(S)+
∑
i∈Sm
Pi(S)−
∑
j∈Ss
Rj(S).
Using (8), we derive
f(S) =
∑
i∈Sm
αiTi(S)−
∑
j∈Ss
µjCj(S).
Remark: Lemma 1 reveals the fact that the total revenues
obtained by the MEC servers equal to the payments of all the
MDs.
In addition, we obtain the second lemma.
Lemma 2. A coalition S should have at least one MD.
Otherwise, u˜i(S) = 0 = u˜i({i}) and v(S) =
∑
i∈S
u˜i(S) = 0.
That is to say, when there are only the MEC servers, the
MEC servers have no stimuli to form coalitions and each MEC
server will act alone.
Proof: When |Sm| = 0, we get Rj(S) = 0 and Cj(S) =
0 according to (3) and (5), respectively. Thus, u˜i(S) = 0.
Specifically, u˜i({i}) = 0. As u˜i(S) = u˜i({i}) in this case,
each MEC server will act alone.
Remark: The function of the MEC server is pre-processing
and forwarding the MD’s signal. So when there is no MD, it
is meaningless to group only the MEC servers together.
On the other hand, when there is no MEC server in a
coalition S, i.e., S ⊆M,
ui(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
∗ ri ∗
∏
j∈M\S
(1− pj)
for i ∈ S and v(S) =
∑
i∈S
ui(S) > 0. Specially when S = {i},
we derive
ui({i}) = piri
∏
j∈M\{i}
(1− pj) .
Hence, when ∃S ⊆M & S ∋ i satisfying ui(S) > ui({i}), the
MDs will form coalitions to improve the utility. Specifically,
let S = {s1, · · · , s|S|} with s1 > · · · > s|S|, based on (1) and
(2), we can derive that if
1 ≥


∏
j∈S\{si}
(1− pj) , i = |S|;
∏
j∈S\{si}
(1−pj)
|S|∏
k=i+1
(1−psk)
, otherwise,
(9)
forming coalition S is profitable.3 Specially, when pi = p,
i.e., all MDs have the same active probability, we can derive
that (9) holds, then forming coalitions is always profitable in
the case. The reason is as follows: Since the formulation of
coalitions can avoid collision, then it can improve the effective
throughput.
The definition for the core of our coalitional game is given
as follows.
Definition 1. The core of (M ∪ S, v) is defined as
C =
{
x ∈ v (M ∪ S) : ∀S, 6 ∃y ∈ v(S), s.t. yi > xi, ∀i ∈ S
}
.
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for the
existence of the core.
Lemma 3. The core of (M ∪ S, v) is nonempty once the
following conditions hold (S ⊂M ∪ S):
1) αi > 0, βi > 0, γj > 0, and µj > 0.
2) αiTi(S) > βiPi(S) or γjRj(S) > µjCj(S).
3) αiTi(M ∪ S) − βiPi(M ∪ S) > αiTi(S) − βiPi(S), and
γjRj(M ∪ S)− µjCj(M ∪ S) > γjRj(S)− µjCj(S).
Proof: When 1) holds, we can find αi, βi, γi, and µj to
satisfy 2). If 2) does not holds, we have
ui({i}) = piri
∏
j∈M/{i}
(1− pj) ≥ 0 ≥ ui(S)
for i ∈ Sm and u˜j(S) ≤ 0 = u˜j({j}) for j ∈ Ss. Then,
each MD and MEC server will act alone. In this case, the
core is empty. When 3) holds, we can prove that (M ∪ S, v)
is balanced [18]. Thus, the core is nonempty according to the
Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
3Although forming S may be not optimal, it is at least better than acting
alone.
51 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Distance
C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
MD 1 covered by MEC-s 3
MD 1 covered by MEC-s 4
MD 2 covered by MEC-s 3
MD 2 covered by MEC-s 4
Fig. 2. Coverage probability v.s. transmit distance, d
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the simulations, we consider 2 MDs (MD 1 and MD 2)
and 2 MEC servers (MEC-s 3 and MEC-s 4). Two dimensional
scenario is considered. MDs are uniformly distributed in an 2-
dimensional area with 10×10, where (5, 5) is its center, MEC-
s 3 locates at (0, 0), MEC-s 4 locates at (7, 6). 106 topology
implementations are averaged to get the mean performance.
Fig. 2 shows the probability of MD 1 and MD 2 being
covered by MEC-s 3 and MEC-s 4, respectively. From the
figure, we can find that the coverage probabilities of MEC-
s 3 over MD 1 and MD 2 are same, and the coverage
probabilities of MEC-s 4 over MD 1 and MD 2 are same
also. In addition, the coverage probability of MEC-s 4 is higher
than that of MEC-s 3 and both increase with the increase of d.
We can explain by theoretical analysis. Since MD 1 and MD
2 are uniformly distributed, the coverage probability can be
computed using Fig. 3 in two-dimensional case. For any MD,
when it is in the overlap of a circle centering at (0, 0) with
radius d, it can be coverage by MEC-s 3. Then, the coverage
probability is the ratio between the area of the overlap and
10 × 10. With the increase of d, the ratio increases (until it
reaches 1). For the MEC-s 4, the center becomes (7, 6) and
we can obtain similar results. Furthermore, as (7,6) is nearer
to (5, 5) (i.e., area center) with the same d, its overlap area is
bigger than that for (0, 0). Then the coverage probability of
MEC-s 4 is higher than that of MEC-s 3.
There are 15 possible coalitional structures for 2-MD and 2-
MEC-s, as listed in Table I. Applying Lemma 2, C11 is similar
as C3 and C12 is similar as C4. Meanwhile, as MD 1 and MD 2
as well as MEC-s 3 and MEC-s 4 are role-exchangeable in the
scheme, we can see that C8 is similar as C2; C9 is similar as
C6; C10, C14 and C15 are similar as C5; and C13 is similar as C7.
In conclusion, we need to consider C1 − C7. In the following
simulations, Ri = 1.8, ri = 1, ξi = 1.5, αi = 10, pi = 0.6,
crji = 0.2, c
f
ji = 0.5, and βi = γi = µi = 1.
Fig. 4 plots the mean utility performance under C1, which
is also referred to as the grand coalition, i.e., all nodes form
(0, 0)
(10,10)
(7,6)
Fig. 3. Theoretical computation of the coverage probability when MDs are
uniformly distributed
TABLE I
COALITION STRUCTURE FOR 4 NODES
C1: {1,2,3,4} C6: {1,3},{2,4} C11: {1,2},{3,4}
C2: {1,3,4},{2} C7: {1,2,3},{4} C12: {1},{2},{3,4}
C3: {1,2},{3},{4} C8: {1},{2,3,4} C13: {1,2,4},{3}
C4: {1},{2},{3},{4} C9: {1,4},{2,3} C14: {1,4},{2},{3}
C5: {1},{3},{2,4} C10: {1},{4},{2,3} C15: {2},{4},{1,3}
one coalition. We can observe that the utility performance
improves when the transmit distance becomes longer. It is
because that with the expand of the transmit distance, the
coverage probability increases. Then the MEC severs could
take part in the data collection with higher probability, and
the rate improves. The performance of MD 1 is better than
that of MD 2 since MD 1 has priority in transmitting node
selection in the scheme when MD 1 and MD 2 in the same
coalition. MEC-s 4 has better coverage probability which leads
to more revenues charged from MDs. Hence MEC-s 4 has
better performance than MEC-s 3.
Fig. 5 demonstrates the mean utility performance under C4,
where each node forms a coalition and transmit solely. We
can find that the utility performance of MEC-s 3 and MEC-s
4 remains as zero. This can be explained by using Lemma 2.
The utility performance of MD 1 and MD 2 are the same and
remain constant. The C4 can be viewed as a baseline.
Fig. 6 shows the mean utility performance under C2. MD 1,
MEC-s 3, and MEC-s 4 are in a coalition. The performance
improves with the increase of transmit distance. As MD 2
transmits solely, the utility remains constant with respect to
transmit distance. The performance of MD 1 is better than
that of MD 2. It verifies that the MEC could improve utility
performance (especially by comparison with Fig. 5).
Fig. 7 illustrates the utility performance with C3. MEC-s
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3 and MEC-s 4 respectively form a coalition. And the utility
performance remain zero, which complies with Lemma 2. MD
1 and MD 2 form one coalition. Since no MEC-s available,
the utility performance are constant. The performance of
MD 1 is better than that of MD 2 because of its priority
in transmitting selection within the coalition. In addition,
compared to Fig. 5, we can see the utility increase of MD
1. That is to say, even without MEC server, forming coalition
is profitable for MD. This can be explained as follows: When
forming coalition, collisions can be avoided. Then the effective
throughput increases and utility improves accordingly.
Fig. 8 depicts the average utility performance under C5
setting. MD 1 and MEC-s 3 respectively constitute a coalition.
Then the utility performance remains constant. MD 2 and
MEC-s 4 form one coalition, and the utility increase with
transmit distance. Furthermore, MD 2 has better performance
than MD 1 and MEC-4 has better performance than MEC-s
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3. This verifies the advances of constituting coalition.
Fig. 9 draws the mean utility performance with C6. In
the setting, MD 1 and MEC-s 3 form one coalition; MD 2
and MEC-s 4 constitute another coalition. Compared with
Fig. 5, utility performance of each node has improvement.
Additionally, MD 2 has better performance than MD 1 and
MEC-4 has better performance than MEC-s 3. This is because
that MEC-s 4 has better coverage probability than MEC-s 3,
then the MEC-s 4 & MD 2 coalition has better performance.
Fig. 10 plots the average utility performance under C7. MD
1, MD 2, and MEC-s 3 constitute one coalition. MEC-s 4
forms another coalition solely. Since MEC-s 4 act alone, its
utility remains zero. MD 1 and MD 2 could utilize MEC-
s 3 for MEC data transmission to the cloud server. Utility
performance increases with increment of d since bigger value
of d incurs higher coverage probability and transmission rate
performance thereafter. MD 1 has better performance than MD
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Fig. 9. Mean utility of C6
2 as MD 1 has selection priority in scheduling.
Comparing utility performance of the considered coalition
structure, we find that the grand coalition, C1, has the best
score. In addition, all utilities in the grand coalition are positive
and αi > 0, βi = γi = µi > 0. Then the conditions of
Lemma 3 hold, we claim that the core is not empty and(
u1(C1), u2(C1), u3(C1), u4(C1)
)
is in the core.
VI. CONCLUSION
Data offloading in muti-MD and multi-MEC-server scenario
is studied in the paper. We propose a coalition based pricing
scheme. The proposed scheme incorporates MD scheduling,
the MEC server selection and offloading encouragement. The-
oretically, coalitional game is first formulated, and the game
is analyzed thereafter. Especially, we give sufficient conditions
for non-empty of the core. In the end, numerical results verify
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Fig. 10. Mean utility of C7
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme by showing the utility
performance.
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